The Tor Blog - Comments for "Traffic correlation using netflows" https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows Comments for "Traffic correlation using netflows" en You're unlikely to find help https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-82888 <p>You're unlikely to find help on this particular blog post.</p> <p>I recommend https://www.torproject.org/about/contact#support</p> Sun, 14 Dec 2014 23:24:20 +0000 arma comment 82888 at https://blog.torproject.org How do i test orbot fore https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-82637 <p>How do i test orbot fore liks . And ned a new SAF link to download orbot . The orbot i get. Is fake frorm tor project . </p> Sat, 13 Dec 2014 15:28:41 +0000 Anonymous comment 82637 at https://blog.torproject.org https://www.torproject.org/do https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-82005 <p>https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#SendPadding</p> <p>In general, this is an open research area. But there are no good or even adequate designs out there currently that are also practical to deploy.</p> Wed, 10 Dec 2014 06:28:10 +0000 arma comment 82005 at https://blog.torproject.org Why doesn't tor send random https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-81996 <p>Why doesn't tor send random data all the time to random nodes to make the connections be less correlative? They see a 200kbps burst on your tor node, and five seconds later see a 200kbps burst coming from the exit node. So why not send a baseline amount of data all of the time, and when real data needs to exit, then back off of sending the fake data by the same amount?</p> Wed, 10 Dec 2014 02:49:39 +0000 Anonymous comment 81996 at https://blog.torproject.org If you are really stuck ,you https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-80262 <p>If you are really stuck ,you could download a copy of the Tails OS<br /> from https://tails.boum.org/ and boot from a live cd </p> Fri, 28 Nov 2014 07:01:17 +0000 Anonymous comment 80262 at https://blog.torproject.org I answer some of this one https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-79934 <p>I answer some of this one here:<br /> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-79929<br /> and in the many other answers here and on<br /> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/quick-summary-recent-traffic-correlation-using-netflows</p> Wed, 26 Nov 2014 04:51:36 +0000 arma comment 79934 at https://blog.torproject.org No, variants of the attack https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-79933 <p>No, variants of the attack can work fine without javascript. (I'm not sure about the attack presented in this paper in particular, but it's a moot question.)</p> Wed, 26 Nov 2014 04:50:42 +0000 arma comment 79933 at https://blog.torproject.org I will see your graph and https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-79932 <p>I will see your graph and raise you one:<br /> https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=bandwidth&amp;start=2010-08-28&amp;end=2014-11-26</p> <p>So yes, bandwidth is getting cheaper, but also the number of users and load on the network will grow to fill whatever the Tor network has to offer.</p> <p>Also, you should do the math on millions of users all using their full bandwidth all the time -- it adds up to look very grim indeed. :( Perhaps what we need are approximations (sometimes known by the phrase 'traffic shaping') that get some of the benefits with only some of the costs?</p> <p>See<br /> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-79929<br /> for more discussion.</p> Wed, 26 Nov 2014 04:49:40 +0000 arma comment 79932 at https://blog.torproject.org It seems to me that as the https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-79931 <p>It seems to me that as the set of relays and flows scales up, the concept of an algorithm with an exactly zero false positive rate gets harder and harder.</p> <p>I mean, feel free to not discuss it, but I think our adversaries do a lot of their discussions in secret already, so our best bet is transparency and openness. Submit your analysis to the PETS symposium:<br /> https://petsymposium.org/2015/<br /> and get some experts to review it. The more we know the more prepared we are!</p> Wed, 26 Nov 2014 04:46:14 +0000 arma comment 79931 at https://blog.torproject.org https://www.torproject.org/do https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows#comment-79930 <p>https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#ChooseEntryExit</p> Wed, 26 Nov 2014 04:44:14 +0000 arma comment 79930 at https://blog.torproject.org